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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2748
________________
Mandrake Conner,
     Appellant
vs.
Mobile Mini Inc.
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-01926)
District Judge: Honorable Clifford Scott Green
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 11, 2006
BEFORE:  FISHER, ALDISERT AND WEIS, CIRCUIT JUDGES
        (Filed January 18, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Mandrake Conner, formerly employed by appellee Mobile Mini
Inc. (“MMI”), appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of MMI. 
The District Court thoroughly recited the factual circumstances leading to the decision to
terminate Conner from his Branch Manager position in MMI’s Milwaukee office because
2of his inability to control his anger in the workplace.  We need not repeat the details here. 
It will suffice for our purposes to note that during the time period beginning
approximately three months after his promotion to Branch Manager in June 2002 and
ending with his termination on March 27, 2003, Conner exhibited problems in the
workplace with anger management – engaging in behavior that was, at times, verbally
abusive and disrespectful of subordinates and others (including a company vendor) – 
despite having received numerous warnings about such behavior as well as counseling in
this area.  Given the complaints lodged against Conner and his apparent inability or
unwillingness to control his anger while serving in the position of Branch Manager, MMI
offered Conner a position as a sales representative in its Chicago office at a salary higher
than that of his previous sales position.  Conner failed to accept this offer by the stated
deadline and his employment with MMI was terminated.
Following his termination, Conner, who is African-American, filed an
administrative charge with the Wisconsin Equal Rights Division alleging racial
discrimination.  After exhausting his administrative remedies, Conner filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging that he had
been unlawfully terminated from his job on account of his race in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.  While not denying that
complaints were lodged against him when he served as a Branch Manager and that his
angry outbursts had to be addressed on several occasions, Conner simply asserted that
3white MMI employees in management positions were treated more favorably than he had
been.  In further support of his racial discrimination charge, Conner stated that a racist
comment was made in his presence by a former MMI manager back in July 2000, that he
was not permitted to discharge a particular employee when he wanted to, and that he did
not receive the same computer training as some of the Chicago-based employees. 
Additionally, Conner alleged that personnel from the Milwaukee and Chicago branch
offices had formed an “evil cabal” to have him removed as Branch Manager.  Finally, in
his briefs in opposition to MMI’s motion for summary judgment, Conner attempted to add
a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et. seq.,
and sought to enlarge the discovery period.  In an order entered on April 29, 2005, the
District Court granted MMI’s summary judgment motion and denied Conner’s motion for
enlargement of the discovery period.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and will affirm
substantially for the reasons given by the District Court.  We are doubtful that a prima
facie case of discrimination has been made out (there was no direct evidence of
discrimination), because Conner, although arguably qualified and a member of a
protected class, made no showing that other MMI management employees who are not
members of a protected class were treated preferentially.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  He was not, for example, the only employee who
received computer training via video tapes instead of in-person by computer specialists. 
4In fact, Patrick Johnson, the Regional Manager who was responsible for overseeing
MMI’s Milwaukee office and offered Conner the Chicago sales position upon his
termination as Branch Manager, received the same form of training.  Moreover, although
Conner was counseled with respect to the appropriate manner in which to document and
discipline an employee who was not working up to company standards, there was no
evidence that, unlike other Branch Managers, he was denied the authority to terminate an
employee deserving of such action.
Like the District Court, however, even assuming arguendo that a prima
facie case of discrimination has been made out, there can be no doubt that there was
nothing pretextual about MMI’s reason for terminating Conner.  See St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993).  To survive a motion for summary judgment
in a discrimination case, a plaintiff may prevail either by discrediting the employer’s
proffered reasons for the termination or by showing that discrimination was more likely
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.  See
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).  There is simply no evidence in the
record, including circumstantial evidence, that Conner’s termination was motivated in any
part by racial animus.  See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 424.  MMI’s
Regional Director identified a problem with Conner’s management style and
argumentative nature early on in his tenure, and steps were taken to address it.  Conner’s
repeated angry outbursts and other shortcomings were well-documented.  He was
5counseled and given genuine opportunities to improve, but he failed to do so.  Finally, he
was warned that any further disrespectful behavior could result in his discharge, and
ultimately he was terminated.  Moreover, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion
that one racist comment made three years earlier by a former employee does not
undermine MMI’s proffered reason for Conner’s termination.
We have carefully reviewed Conner’s other contentions on appeal and find
them to be meritless.  As correctly noted by appellee, the District Court committed no
error in failing to consider Conner’s attempt to amend his complaint to add an ADA claim
where discovery was closed after having been opened for nearly a year and a motion for
summary judgment had already been filed by MMI.  Moreover, Conner did not satisfy the
prerequisites for bringing such a claim.  The ADA requires that, before bringing suit, a
plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting Title VII enforcement scheme and remedies for
ADA).  Conner did not raise his claim of discrimination on the basis of disability with the
Wisconsin Equal Rights Division.  Likewise, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to extend the discovery period in light of Conner’s failure to explain
how such an extension would be productive and given his failure to previously move to
compel greater disclosures from MMI.  Finally, it is all too obvious that the entry of
appearance of one of MMI’s attorneys on behalf of Conner was nothing more than the
result of a typographical error in MMI counsel’s motion for admittance filed in December
62004.  The District Court was clearly operating, as were all parties, under the belief that
Conner was proceeding in a pro se manner.  In fact, the Deputy Clerk of the Employment
Discrimination Panel attempted to secure pro bono representation for Conner until the
District Court entered an order on March 3, 2005, discontinuing such attempts and
directing Conner to continue to proceed pro se or retain counsel himself.  There is thus no
merit to appellant’s contention that such a minor error necessitates a reversal of the
District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of MMI.
Accordingly, for essentially the reasons set forth by the District Court, we
will affirm the District Court’s judgment entered April 29, 2005 and deny Conner’s
motion to reverse the summary judgment of the District Court.
